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Abstract 
The paper evaluates Nielsen’s second principle of justice and compares it with Rawls’ difference principle. 
The conclusion arrived at is that their difference is one of degree and not of substance since they both 
promote inequalities.  The paper also argues against Beiner’s perspective regarding political citizenship 
as the sole end worthy of pursuit. It concludes that economic equality also ought to be pursued as an end 
itself. 
Introduction 
Socialism is a political theory that is unfortunately commonly misinterpreted by liberals, especially those 
on the far right.  Williamson, for instance, holds the view that “Socialists and communists themselves 
acknowledge that socialism is not separate from communism” (Williamson, 2011: 1).  He further maintains 
that “Communism is utopia – everyone is equal, there is no money, everyone just gets what they need” 
(Williamson, 2011: 18). 
Briefly, socialism is a political theory that regards political and economic equality to be the basic ideal.  
Socialism justifies only those coercive institutions that promote equality.  On the other hand, communism 
is a political system whose final end is a classless society.  Marx himself never identified socialism with 
communism.  In his Philosophy of History, Marx identifies six stages of the evolution of the human society, 
namely: primitive communalism; slavery; feudalism (which is a refined form of slavery); capitalism (which 
is also a refined form of feudalism and slavery); socialism (the intermediate stage between capitalism and 
communism); and communism.  According to Marx, communism is the last stage when most of the work 
that the workers perform becomes its own reward.  At this stage differential monetary reward will generally 
become unnecessary.  Correctly conceived, socialism simply aims at drastically reducing inequalities that 
enables some people to be rich enough to buy others and some poor enough to sell themselves.  It also aims 
at achieving political equality for all citizens of a socialist society.  So, it is inherently wrong to think that 
socialism and communism are not separate.  Although I concur with Marx’s principle that from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs, I am a socialist who does not regard himself falling 
on the communist camp. 
1. Nielsen’s Critique of Rawls’ Egalitarian Liberalism 
In his celebrated Equality and Liberty, Nielsen argues that Rawls’ own interpretation of his second 
principle, that is, the difference principle, is such that it allows inequalities which undermine any effective 
application of the equal liberty principle.  Nielsen also argues that given Rawls’ own interpretation of his 
difference principle, it is nearly impossible that citizens of Rawls’ well-ordered society can obtain a fair 
equality of opportunity.  Nielsen does not only criticize Rawls’ principles of justice, he also provides an 
alternative. 
Nielsen’s two principles of justice: his first principle runs as follows: 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal Liberties 
and opportunities (including equal opportunities for meaningful work, for self-
determination and political and economic participation) compatible with a similar 
treatment of all.  This principle gives expression to a commitment to attain and/or sustain 
equal moral autonomy and equal self-respect” (Nielsen, 1985: 48). 
In as far as the first principle is concerned; Nielsen holds that his principle and Rawls’ are basically the 
same.  Concerning the equal liberty principle, Nielsen maintains that “there is no serious difference between 
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us and I am plainly indebted to Rawls here” (Nielsen, 1985: 49).  For Nielsen, “the crucial thing about the 
first principle is its insistence that in a through and through just society we must all… be in a position to 
control the design of our own lives and we must in our collective decisions have right to equal say” (Nielsen, 
1985: 49).  In this sense, Nielsen and Rawls have the same conception of equal liberty principle since they 
respectively maintain that citizens of a just society must be in a position to control the designs of their own 
lives.  Their first principles respectively seem to be derived from a Kantian background since them 
similarly, in their own words, give expression to the value of moral autonomy. 
But, there already exists serious differences between the two since Nielsen places the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity on the same footing with equal liberty principle.  Perhaps this is because Nielsen 
holds that although he shares the same conception of equal liberty principle with Rawls, he does not 
however claim the strict priority for his first principle over the second principle as Rawls does.  But if 
Nielsen is indebted to Rawls is as far as the liberty principle is concerned, he must agree with Rousseau’s 
and Kant’s arguments for liberty, arguments which Rawls relies on when saying that liberty is most 
important.  If Nielsen shares these arguments with Rawls, arguments that make liberty so important, it is 
hard to see why he cannot claim the strict priority for the principle of liberty. 
Nielsen formulates his second principle such that, 
After provisions are made for common social (community) values, for capital overhead to 
preserve the society’s productive capacity, allowances made for differing manipulated 
needs and preferences, and due weight is given to the just entitlements of individuals, the 
income and wealth (the common stock of means) is to be so divided that each person will 
have a right to an equal share.  The necessary burdens requisite to enhance human well-
being are also to be equally shared, subject, of course, to limitations by differing abilities 
and differing situations (Nielsen, 1985: 48). 
What distinguishes Nielsen’s second principle from Rawls’ is his emphasis that the distribution of our 
resources must be such that they are to be divided such that each person will have a right to an equal share.  
Nielsen puts more emphasis on the common social values.  He stresses that the community has a right to 
an equal share to the common stock of means.  On social and economic values, Nielsen maintains that 
income and wealth must be shared equally as far as possible.  I presume that it is because of his insistence 
and emphasis on social communal values that Nielsen maintains that there exists sharp differences between 
his second principle and Rawls’ difference principle. 
Nielsen’s claim that the community has a right to an equal share of resources depicts his second 
principle of justice as being more egalitarian than Rawls’ difference principle in as far as the commitment 
to equality is concerned.  While acknowledging the importance of equal basic liberties in his first principle 
of justice, Nielsen correctly includes equal opportunities for meaningful work.  This inclusion can be 
instrumental in the pursuit of equality.  If the state could make providing equal opportunities for meaningful 
work to all one of its priorities, perhaps citizens themselves could play a vital role in our pursuit of equality. 
However, when explaining his principles, Nielsen does not tell us why citizens must feel obliged 
to commit themselves to communal responsibility.  Undoubtedly, the pursuit of equality will necessarily 
oblige some people to sacrifice some of the belongings they are entitled to.  But this attitude is vehemently 
opposed by the right-wing liberals who maintain that individuals are entitled to what they have legitimately 
acquired, and that no one has a right to claim it without violating their right to personal property.  In defence 
of his liberty principle, Rawls maintains that sacrificing some for others is injustice.  But a serious 
commitment to equality unavoidably involves sacrifice of some for others.  Nielsen seems to be taking his 
commitment to equality seriously by maintaining that income and wealth must be shared equally as far as 
possible.  However, given that this sharing involves more sacrifice on others, he should have justified why 
they must sacrifice what they are entitled to.  He seems to have omitted an explanation that his liberal critics 
demand. 
Nielsen also owes us an explanation as to how he will handle the different types of the worst off 
people in his pursuit of equality.  A more thorough classification of the worst off people is as follows: some 
people are worst off because they are naturally disadvantaged, least talented, involuntarily unemployed, 
and others because they chose to be so.  The last category is that of those who are unemployed voluntarily, 
have a sense of expensive taste, and those who voluntarily develop a risk-gambling habit such as smoking.  
I assume that Nielsen will deploy a generally accepted income tax scheme to pursue his commitment to 
equality.  Given, that people are worst off for different reasons, Nielsen should explain to us how he will 
handle the situation in his pursuit of equality while bearing in mind the liberty principle that he respects. 
1.2 The impact of Rawls’ difference principle on the liberty principle 
Nielsen’s main argument against Rawls’ difference principle is that Rawls’ own interpretation of the 
difference principle is such that it allows and justifies inequalities that undermine any effective application 
of the liberty principle.  According to Nielsen, Rawls subordinates the second principle to the first in order 
to secure equal basic liberties of all the free and equal citizens of a well-ordered society.  But it is precisely 
this subordination, Nielsen maintains, which in practice undermines an effective application of equal liberty 
principle.  The present inequalities justified by the difference principle beget unintended inequalities of 
liberty rights between the well off and the worst off. 
Presumably, Rawls would respond by restating his main claim for the difference principle, a claim 
that Nielsen would undoubtedly concur with.  For Rawls, inequalities are allowed primarily to alleviate the 
least fortunate members of society from their unwanted conditions.  If entrepreneurs are given their just 
entitlements, they will advance their skills and so provide more jobs for unskilled labourers.  Of course, 
they will consequently become wealthier.  However, this arrangement which unavoidably leads to the 
disparity of economic standing is advantageous to the worst off people because in the long run they will 
become better off.  Should inequalities not be allowed, Rawls would argue, either the least advantaged 
would remain where they are or they will end up being in a more miserable condition.  So, it is preferable 
to allow inequalities and make them better off, than not allow them and make them more miserable. 
However, Nielsen’s main complaint is that it is the very disparities allowed by the difference 
principle which beget unintended consequences with regard to the most important liberty principle.  Rawls 
gives priority to the liberty principle and maintains that each citizen must have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.  But the allowed inequalities, 
Nielsen argues, are such that the worst off cannot effectively exercise some of their basic liberties because 
of some external constraints.  The rich members of society, for example, have more access to exercise their 
right to the freedom of speech through the media than the poor because in a capitalist society one must pay 
in order to convey one’s message through the media.  In this case, the least advantaged members of society 
have in principle a right to the freedom of speech and press, a right which in practice is inoperable.  So, 
Nielsen correctly holds that “a liberty that we cannot effectively exercise, particularly because of some 
powerful external constraints, is hardly a liberty” (Nielsen, 1985: 52).  Opting for the difference principle, 
Nielsen argues, makes it hard for people to actually achieve equal liberty.  According to Nielsen, regardless 
of the claim that the allowed inequalities are likely to make the worst off better off, if they make the equal 
liberty principle inoperable, even Rawls would not opt for the difference principle. 
A similar critique of the inadequacy of Rawls’ difference principle is made by Daniels.  According 
to Daniels,  “inequalities of wealth and accompanying inequalities in power tend to produce inequalities of 
liberty” (Daniels, 1975: 256).  Daniels supports his claim by citing instances whereby the allowed 
inequalities in wealth tend to lead to a disparity in treatment between persons.  Both the rich and the poor, 
Daniels maintains, are equal before the law and are equally entitled to have a fair trial.  However, the rich 
have more access to a better legal counsel, and as a result stand in a better position to have more influence 
in the administration of justice in the determination of what crimes will be prosecuted, and they stand a 
better chance of securing the laws that will suit their own interests.  Again, if an unskilled parent is unable 
to freely choose which school her child will attend, it means she is not free to do so.  Her failure to afford 
to send her child to the school of her choice means she has no freedom of choice.  But nothing prohibits an 
entrepreneur to send his child to the school of his choice because he has the money required.  However, 
some may argue that failing to send her child to some chosen school, particularly a private school, does not 
mean that she has no freedom of choice, instead, she has freedom among fewer choices.  But, my point is 
that if her economic situation is such that she cannot send her child to a private school, even if she would 
have preferred, it is hard to see how we can still maintain that she has a choice between send her child either 
to a private school or a public school.  If by saying that she has fewer choices we mean choosing between 
public schools only, then, the wealthy have more choices because they can either send their children to 
private or public schools.  But Rawls’ citizens are entitled to have equal basic liberties, and in this case they 
do not have equal basic right of the freedom of choice.  It follows, therefore, that inequalities of wealth tend 
to produce inequalities of liberties.  The least fortunate cannot effectively exercise some of their basic 
liberties due to the disparities allowed by the difference principle. 
For Rawls, the representatives in the original position are exposed to a variety of principles of social 
justice, that is, principles required for making a choice among the various social arrangements which 
determine the division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares.  
The parties in the original position, Rawls maintains, will choose the two principles of justice. 
In response to the criticism brought against his difference principle, Rawls is not unaware that 
inequalities in some basic liberties are likely to emerge due to the inequalities in wealth allowed by the 
difference principle.  With regard to education, for instance, Rawls holds that “the difference principle 
would allocate resources in education, say, so as to improve the long term expectation of the least favoured” 
(Rawls, 1971: 101).  In order to meet the urgent needs of those born in the less favourable social conditions, 
the difference principle requires that greater resources be spent on their education more than on those born 
in wealthy families.  The differences still exist, of course, however, the difference principle is arranged such 
that everyone, particularly the least fortunate, benefit from economic and social inequalities. 
Rawls acknowledges that the worth of liberty is not the same for everyone.  Entrepreneurs possess 
more wealth, and consequently have more opportunities to attain their goals and secure their liberties.  
However, Rawls claims, “the lesser worth of liberty is compensated for, since the capacity of the less 
fortunate members of society to achieve their aims would be even less were they not to accept the existing 
inequalities whenever the difference principle is satisfied” (Rawls, 1971: 204).  The difference principle 
encourages and allows entrepreneurs to acquire more wealth primarily in view of raising the long term 
prospects of the representative man who is worst off.  The entrepreneurs’ better prospects act as incentives 
to produce a more efficient economic process.  As the process runs its course, ultimately the conditions of 
the less fortunate members of society are improved.  Should inequalities not be justified by the difference 
principle, Rawls argues, either the situation of the least fortunate will remain where it is, or it will be worse 
than it is.  So, it is better to opt for half a loaf than for no bread at all. 
However, despite the fact that the difference principle is beneficial to the worst off people, it 
hampers some of their basic liberties.  It is the case, as Nielsen and Daniels have shown, the allowed 
inequalities tend to undermine some of their basic liberties, Rawls fails to attain one of his most important 
goals, namely, liberty.  Now, Nielsen holds that with his second principle of justice, a principle which 
differs sharply with Rawls’ difference principle, liberty can be attained.  For me, the serious difference 
consists in that Nielsen places more emphasis on common social values.  However, there exists a similarity 
between Rawls’ second principle of justice and Nielsen’s second egalitarian principle of justice. 
A notable similarity consists in that their respective second principles are committed to reducing 
inequalities and have equality as their end.  For Rawls, unless there is a distribution that makes persons 
better off, an equal distribution is to be preferred.  Since inequalities are unavoidable, the difference 
principle justifies only those inequalities that will make the worst off better off.  If his difference principle 
is committed to making the worst off better off, it is not implausible to claim that it has equality as its 
ultimate goal.  Similarly, Nielsen states that after just entitlements are made, the distribution must be such 
that each person has a right to an equal share.  He emphasizes that resources must be shared equally as far 
as possible.  The notable difference in this regard is that of degree that determines whose theory appears 
more egalitarian. 
Nielsen correctly holds that there exists a serious difference between his second principle and 
Rawls’ difference principle.  The following apparent similarity between their second principles will lead us 
to the fundamental difference.  Nielsen maintains that the primary aim of his second principle of justice that 
is more egalitarian than Rawls’ is to reduce inequalities in primary social goods.  But at the same time he 
specifies that his radical egalitarian principle does not claim that wealth should be divided equally like 
dividing up a pie equally (Nielsen, 1985: 53).  It seems to me that the main claim of Nielsen’s radical 
egalitarian principle of justice is that it argues for a distribution of income and wealth which is such that its 
outcome will be compatible with people having different abilities and needs, and that such benefits and 
burdens be equally shared as far as possible by all citizens of a just society.  But it seems to me also that 
there is an apparent similarity between Nielsen’s second principle of justice and Rawls’ difference principle. 
First, there seems to be a similarity in that the second principles of both theorists respectively permit 
inequalities. Rawls’ difference principle states that while the distribution of income and wealth need not be 
equal, they must be to everyone’s advantage.  For Rawls, the talented members of society are entitled to 
receive the wages their labour deserves.  The advantage of just entitlements of individuals is that while the 
society’s productive capacity is preserved, the talented rich people are encouraged to utilize all their 
abilities, in the long run they improve the long-term expectations of the least talented members of society.  
As I have shown, these allowed inequalities serve as incentives that render the economic process to become 
more efficient.  In the last analysis, the inequalities justified by the difference principle make the worst off 
better off. 
In a similar fashion, Nielsen’s second principle states that ‘due weight is given to the just 
entitlements of individuals’.  To preserve the society’s productive capacity, individuals are first entitled to 
receive just wages.  Presumably, this will serve as an incentive for them.  If due weight is not given to the 
just entitlements of individuals, there will be no motivating factor for them to produce more.  
According to Nielsen, it is only after ‘due weight is given to the just entitlements of individuals’ 
that ‘the income and wealth is to be so divided that each person will have a right to an equal share’.  In my 
view, when an equal distribution is made, inequalities still exist because all simply share the remaining 
pieces of bread while some have already received their full just entitlements.  It is unlikely that the talented 
individuals will sacrifice their just entitlements so that all may have an equal share.  Presumably, the 
talented individuals will demand their just entitlements which act as incentives for them to produce more 
so that their production can be arranged so as to meet the needs of the community.  Inequalities between 
the talented individuals who receive their just entitlements and the least talented individuals of Nielsen’s 
just society seem to be unavoidable.  If inequalities allowed by Rawls’ difference principle fail to secure 
some basic liberties of the least advantaged members of a well-ordered society, are not unavoidable 
inequalities in Nielsen’s second principle failing to secure some basic liberties of the least talented members 
of a just society? However, as noted earlier, Nielsen’s second principle of justice is more egalitarian than 
Rawls’ difference since his second principle posits more emphasis on common social values. 
Surprisingly, without revoking what he said in one of his earlier writings, Nielsen opposes the idea 
of providing incentives.  In his “Impediments to Radical Egalitarianism”, he emphatically maintains that 
the talented people need not to be awarded inequalities of differential incentives.  He holds the view that in 
an egalitarian society everyone is materially secured; and if talented people regard additional training as a 
form of sacrifice that deserves special reward, then the years of training could be prolonged.  According to 
Nielsen, if the pace in additional training is slowed down, this should no longer be seen as a form of 
sacrifice.  Therefore, there is no need to provide special incentives. 
Elsewhere, I have thus responded to Nielsen’s abolition of incentives: “Absolute abolition of 
incentives is a high risk for the entire social economy.  People who are naturally endowed with exceptional 
talents, talents which, if deployed could bring about a tremendous contribution to the growth of the economy 
of their society, could easily change careers in Nielsen radical egalitarianism” (Manyeli, 2010: 330).  
Inevitably, if it is the case that in an egalitarian society everyone would be materially secured, most people 
would abandon their careers to avoid stress and strain.  I have therefore, suggested that incentives be 
drastically reduced, not absolutely abolished to ensure the stability of the economy in an egalitarian society.  
In other words, I opt for a moderate socialism.  Unlike in Rawls’ apparent egalitarian society where 
provisions of incentives to the talented people is encouraged, drastic reduction of inequalities of differential 
incentives will at least be useful to all members of an egalitarian society in that they themselves will be in 
a better position to protect their own basic liberties. 
2. Liberal citizenship 
In his Social Justice in the Liberal State, Ackerman conceives a citizen as any creature capable of engaging 
in a mutual dialogue about power.  According to Ackerman, in the liberal state any person who can claim 
a legitimate right to the distribution of resources qualifies to be a citizen.  In this sense, Ackerman’s 
conception of citizenship is primarily based on active participation in political dialogue and having a say in 
the distribution of material resources.  Individuals merely compete for individual goods.  In fact, this is in 
accordance with liberalism’s main claim that individuals as citizens should pursue their own plans and 
projects. 
Beiner correctly maintains the view that Ackerman’s citizens are exclusively individualistic in the 
sense that economic dialogue about collective resources is such a crucial and important issue that they shun.  
Their main concern centres around the distribution of material resources for exclusive individual ends.  
Their community is so shallow that they neglect to debate collectively about important topics such as 
political conversation.  Deliberation about the substance of civic ties that can in fact enrich their community 
is as a matter of fact the least they can do.  I concur with Beiner’s critic taking into consideration the fact 
that the conception of liberal citizens is such that individuals are prior to the community to which they 
belong.  But this view is hard to come in terms with when we take into consideration an undeniable fact 
that individuals are born and grow in communities.  It is inconceivable that they can survive without their 
respective communities. 
Discontent with the liberal conception of citizenship, Beiner defines his ideal conception of 
citizenship as: “active participation in a dialogue that indeed weighs the substantive merit of competing 
conceptions of the good and that aims at transforming social arrangements in the direction of what is judged, 
in this active public dialogue, as the best possible (individual and collective) good” (Beiner, 1995: 104).  In 
contrast to Ackerman’s conception of citizenship, a conception that runs along monadological lines, 
Beiner’s definition of citizenship has a social dimension.  His ideal conception of citizenship is that of 
members of a political community participating actively in the shaping of a shared collective destiny.  In 
my view, this ideal socialist conception of citizenship correctly empowers members in a political 
community to be involved actively in a political dialogue when social arrangements geared towards a shared 
collective goal are being deliberated upon.  I regard this view to be ideal as community values are inclusive 
to all members of a social political community. 
2.2 Socialism and citizenship 
Socialism is a political theory that posits equal emphasis on equality and liberty.  While acknowledging the 
importance of the liberty of individuals, socialism equally asserts the equality of human beings.  It follows, 
therefore, that equality and liberty are essential constituents of socialism.  It is worth noting that by 
‘equality’ socialists refer to both economic and political equality.  It is precisely the inclusion of the former 
element, that is, economic equality that entitles socialists to claim the political theory they cherish as being 
strongly egalitarian. 
Fundamental to socialism is the claim that given the proper interpretation, liberty and equality are 
mutually supporting.  Liberty requires equality (Nielsen, 1985: 20), in particular, an equality of power.  
“Freedom and equality, far from being opposed ideals, actually coincide” (Daniels, 1987: 133).  In arguing 
for a coincidence of liberty and equality, socialists pave the way for the claim that strongly egalitarian 
democratic governments enhance freedom.  Socialists do not regard private property as the enemy of 
freedom.  But they correctly do regard some private enterprises producing inegalitarian concentrations of 
property as being the enemy of freedom.  In this sense, the view that socialists place equality (particularly 
economic equality) in a supreme position, relegating liberty to secondary status, is clearly flawed.  This 
mode of thought may be due to the serious error that since liberalism and socialism are opposed theories, 
as standard bearers of equality, socialists uphold equality over liberty. 
While not discounting the concept of equality (in particular, economic equality) in defining 
socialism, Beiner sets out to construct what he regards as a preferable alternative case for socialism.  He 
constructs “an alternative case for socialism that revolves around citizenship rather than social justice, 
around political enfranchisement rather than economic entitlements, and that substitutes the concept of 
solidarity for that of social equality as its pivotal term” (Beiner, 1995: 143).  According to Beiner, making 
a case for socialism strictly on social and distributive justice runs the risk of leaning towards liberalism as 
a political theory that centres on the language of rights and entitlements. 
Beiner further clarifies his case by maintaining that his point “is that it is quite intelligible to assert 
the priority of politics over economics, which in this context means that as citizens we are prepared to 
subordinate questions of social and economic distribution to questions of political membership” (Beiner, 
1995: 145).  He contends that the questions of economic distribution and entitlement claims are contingent.  
Given that economics is contingent, he sets out to establish an independent argument for egalitarian political 
commitments.  Therefore, following this mode of thought it can be concluded that politics is prior to 
economics.  According to Beiner, social equality is not an end in itself, but rather, a means to an end.  His 
contention is that social equality is simply sought to make us better citizens and to share experience of a 
political community. 
For Beiner, “A major turn toward socialist ideals and the corresponding political objectives would 
not come about unless people in very large numbers took an extremely active interest in politics and 
seriously concerned themselves with problems of political change.  In short, they would have to exercise 
citizenship in the fullest way” (Beiner, 1995: 147).  When defining socialism I have specified that by 
‘equality’ socialists refer to both economic and political equality.  If people are considered and do regard 
themselves as equals, they are in a better position to collectively engage themselves in enhancing in political 
change.  In the case whereby politics is reserved to the government and the few exceptionally wealthy, the 
remaining majority is deprived of their right to exercise citizenship in the fullest way. 
But, Beiner’s contention that ‘the standard case for socialism turns on an argument about 
distributive justice… and that it has the concept of equality as its defining term’, implies that socialism is a 
homogenous concept.  The standard case of socialism that Beiner talks about, that confines the concept of 
equality to economic equality is not the only one universally accepted definition of socialism.  As a matter 
of fact, there are many variations in the concept of socialism, depending on points of emphasis.  When 
defining socialism, I specified that by ‘equality’ socialists refer to both economic and political equality.  It 
is unfortunate that the concept of equality be confined to economic equality.  But the fact remains true that 
the term equality encompasses politics and economics. It may be the case that due to the prevailing 
disparities of wealth, some socialists may have overemphasized the concept of economic equality at the 
detriment of undermining the importance of political equality.  Given the alarming existing inequalities of 
wealth, especially in the developing nations, it is possible that some socialists may mistakenly posit more 
emphasis on economic equality while explaining socialism.  But that does not rule out the fact that political 
equality is also a defining concept in as far as socialism is concerned.  Socialists are pioneers of political 
equality.  So, I do not cherish the standard case of socialism that revolves around social justice or economic 
entitlements since it is confined to one concept of socialism. 
While elaborating his standpoint view on socialism and citizenship, Beiner asserts the priority of 
politics over economics, and maintains that, that is quite intelligible.  He holds the view that citizens of a 
socialist society are ready to ‘subordinate question of social and economic distribution to questions of 
political membership’.  At this juncture, I want to recall Rawls’ theory of justice. Rawls expressly states 
that “the principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted only 
for the sake of liberty” (Rawls, 1971: 302).  The lexical order of Rawls’ two principles of justice is such 
that the liberty principle is prior to the principle of distributive justice.  Rawls does not permit an exchange 
between basic liberties and economic and social gains.  But, the lexical order of Rawls’ principles of justice 
is detrimental to the liberty principle itself.  It must be borne in mind that wealth and power are inseparable.  
Rawls’ subordination of his second principle to the first, and his allowing social and economic inequalities 
creates a society of rich powerful individuals and that of poor and powerless ones.  Consequently, the 
wealthy powerful individuals are more privileged to exercise political liberty, while the poor powerless 
individuals simply talk about political liberty that in actual fact they cannot effectively exercise. 
Similarly, Beiner’s subordination of economics to politics is destined to inequalities in citizenship.  
Beiner must admit that in the real world of politics the inseparability of wealth and power is inevitable.  The 
inequalities of wealth and the accompanying inequalities in power will tend to produce unwanted 
inequalities of citizenship.  Political liberty comprises, for instance, the right to be eligible for office, 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and so on.  In the case whereby questions of social and economic 
distribution are relegated to the secondary status, Beiner must admit that citizens cannot fully participate in 
effective political voice.  So, instead of asserting the priority of politics over economics, I propose that 
questions of social and economic distribution and questions of political membership be regarded as ends 
that must be pursued.  Social equality must be sought for its own sake since it enables citizens to have a 
common experience of political community.  It is worth noting that it is useless to talk about citizens having 
political voice while because of financial constraints they cannot effectively exercise citizenship fully.  
Beiner holds the view that socialist ideals and political objectives could be realizable if people in great 
numbers actively participate in politics.  But if the problem of economic inequalities is not adequately 
addressed, people cannot exercise citizenship in the fullest way. 
However, Beiner makes an important observation.  He correctly notes that there is “one important 
respect in which egalitarian social conditions certainly do foster citizenship and civic solidarity.  If there 
exists substantial disparities of wealth and opportunity, the common exercise of citizenship will be blocked 
by social divisions and feelings of relative deprivation” (Beiner, 1995: 148).  Inevitably, the prevailing 
substantial disparities of wealth is the main barrier for people to exercise citizenship in the fullest way.  In 
the real world of politics it is useless to talk about people having effective political voice if they are 
economically constrained.  There is a tight link between wealth and power.  Given the utmost importance 
of economic equality, it ought not to be subordinated to politics since it is precisely this subordination that 
is an impediment for people to have an effective political voice. 
Discontent with the socialist contention that regards politics as the means and economic equality 
as the end, Beiner reverses this perspective and suggests that economic equality be regarded as the means 
and greater exercise of political citizenship be conceived as the end.  I propose that both economic equality 
and politics be regarded as ends.  Economic equality ought not to be pursuit merely for the greater exercise 
of political citizenship.  It is above all most crucially needed for the general welfare and well-being of the 
people.  With the existing economic inequalities, only the chosen few wealthy people are privileged to 
exercise political citizenship fully and can afford to meet nearly all their basic needs.  I believe that the 
pursuit of economic equality as an end can enable the masses living below poverty line, whose task currently 
is to further enrich the well off, live a normal life and exercise political citizenship too.  In my view, by 
relegating economic equality to secondary status Beiner is unaware restating the position of the right-wing 
liberals who are comfortable with the situation of the worst off people.  Beiner misses the point by regarding 
politics as the sole end worthy of pursuit.  Economic equality too ought to be pursued as an end. 
I want to end this discussion with a right-wing liberal who is vehemently opposed to the idea of 
economic equality.  In his Shakedown Socialism, Atbashian holds the view that: 
Since economic equality cannot be attained by bringing everyone up to the level of the 
achievers, the achievers will have to be brought down to the level of mediocrity, with most 
of their earnings and property taken by the government.  Even the most “progressive” 
achievers wouldn’t submit to this voluntarily…, so it has to be a forced measure.  To do 
this on a national scale, the state must assume supremacy over private citizens and limit 
certain freedoms.  What’s more, forced extraction and redistribution corrupts the 
government by giving it arbitrary powers to determine various people’s needs, for which 
there can be no objective standards… A complete economic equality is unattainable.  Since 
all of us have different talents, experiences, knowledge, skills, ambitions, and physical 
characteristics, the only way to make us equal is to bring us down to the lowest common 
denominator (Atbashian, 2010: 86, 87, 89). 
First, that a complete economic equality is unattainable is a fact that is inevitable.  That is why I have 
suggested drastic reduction of differential incentives.  The kind of socialism I have construed and argued 
for is such that a complete economic equality cannot be attained.  My standpoint view is that allowing 
economic inequality can be detrimental to the dignity of the worst off since poverty is such that people can 
accept any offer for survival.  As I have said, the rich can end up being rich enough to buy others and the 
worst off poor enough to sell themselves 
Second, Atbashian holds the view that the only way for socialists to attain economic equality is to 
bring down the achievers to the level of the have-nots.  But, socialists do not aim at impoverishing the rich 
in order to attain economic equality.  Contrary to Atbashian’s assumption, socialists maintain the view that 
the achievers ought to work hand in hand with the least talented in view of bridging the gap between the 
two groups.  That is why I have suggested reduction and not absolute abolition of incentives.  Reduction of 
differential incentives cannot bring down the achievers to the level of mediocrity. 
Third, Atbashian maintains that bringing down the achievers to the level of mediocrity in view of 
attaining economic equality can only be done by the government by forcefully depriving the achievers of 
their personal property.  I have already shown that socialism cannot aim at equating the achievers with the 
worst off without heading towards the decline of the economy.  In a socialist society private ownership is 
permissible in the area of personal property.  Fundamental to socialism is that there is no moral right to the 
private ownership and control of private productive resources since they beget large unwanted economic 
inequalities if handled by selfish talented individuals. 
Fourth, for Atbashian, given that people have different talents, the only way to attain equality is to 
bring down the successful naturally endowed to the lowest common denominator.  It is a fact that some 
people are more talented than others.  But it is by sheer luck that some people happen to be more talented; 
and it is by brute bad luck that some people are born less endowed, it is not a matter of choice.  So, if 
internal endowments are morally arbitrary, the naturally advantaged have no reason to complain if we can 
distribute resources such that those who do not deserve to have been born with less talents can also enjoy 
the benefits.  I am not surprised that Atbashian does not even mention the people who are naturally 
disadvantaged since for liberal capitalist survival of the fittest is a normal practice.  Real socialist talented 
citizens cannot complain when partaking in the endeavour to work towards coming closer to economic 
equality. 
Conclusion 
I have shown that Nielsen’s second principle of justice differs slightly with Rawls’ difference principle.  
Rawls’ difference principle allows inequalities under the umbrella and pretence of making the worst off 
better off.  Nielsen’s second principle permits inequalities by giving just entitlements prior to sharing 
equally the common stock, it is just a difference of degree.  I have proposed drastic reduction of differential 
incentives as a preferable solution that can at least lead to the socialist ideal of equality. 
I have argued against what Beiner regards as the standard case of socialism that confines socialism 
on an argument about distributive justice.  I have also rejected Beiner’s own claim that economic equality 
be regarded as a mere means of political citizenship.  Socialism correctly construed has both economic and 
political equality as its defining concepts.  Contrary to Beiner’s view, economic equality is worth pursuit 
for its own sake for the general welfare and well-being of a socialist society. 
I end this paper responding to Williamson’s unfounded claim that socialism promotes large 
inequalities.  He holds that “The planners are the biggest beneficiaries of socialism… the is another group 
of people with an even stronger set of incentives: the central planners themselves” (Williamson, 2011: 85, 
89).  Elsewhere (Manyeli, 2012: 44-54), I have plainly shown that the task of what Williamson calls central 
planners is to monitor incentives which induce people to work harder, not to be beneficiaries of socialism.  
If central planners are a group of people with an even stronger set of incentives and are at the same time 
entrusted with the task of drastically reducing differential incentives, amounting to a contradiction that can 
lead to the destruction of socialism itself.  If Williamson has seen central planners in socialism with an even 
stronger set of incentives, they must be liberal capitalists who pretend to be socialists.  Capitalists cannot 
perform if not offered stronger set of incentives.  Real socialists who are convinced of equality as the 
socialist ideal of equality cannot provide themselves with huge set of incentive without contradicting 
themselves  
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